Experimenting with every American king.

The standard contemporary semantics for 'every' predict the truth of occurrences of sentences with restrictors that denote the empty set, such as 'Every American king lives in New York'. The literature on empty restrictors has been concerned with explaining a particular violation of this prediction: many assessors consider empty-restrictor sentences to be odd rather than valued, and they are apparently more likely to do so when such sentences include determiners like 'every' as opposed to those like 'no'. Empirical investigation of this issue is overdue, and I present the results of three experimental surveys. The first unexpected outcome is that there is no evidence of a contrast in assessors' tendencies to judge sentences to be odd based on determiner type. An additional surprising result is that those assessors who assign a truth value to sentences where 'every' combines with an empty restrictor overwhelmingly assign the value false. The full results do not fit straightforwardly with any existing account.

Paradox and context shift.

The Liar sentence L, which reads 'L is not true', can be used to produce an apparently valid argument proving that L is not true and that L is true. There has been increasing recognition of the appeal of contextualist solutions to the Liar paradox. Contextualist accounts hold that some step in the reasoning induces a context shift that causes the apparently contradictory claims to occur at different contexts. Attempts at identifying the most promising contextualist account often rely on timing arguments, which seek to isolate a step at which the context cannot be claimed to have shifted or must have shifted. The literature contains a number of timing arguments that draw incompatible conclusions about the location of the context shift. I argue that no existing timing arguments succeed. An alternative strategy for assessing contextualist accounts evaluates the plausibility of their explanations of why the context shifts. However, even this strategy yields no clear verdict about which contextualist account is the most promising. I conclude that there are some grounds for optimism and for pessimism about the potential to adequately motivate contextualism.

How to have a metalinguistic dispute.

There has been recent interest in the idea that speakers who appear to be having a verbal dispute may in fact be engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation: they are communicating information about how they believe an expression should be used. For example, individuals involved in a dispute about whether a racehorse is an athlete might be communicating their diverging views about how 'athlete' should be used. While many have argued that metalinguistic negotiation is a pervasive feature of philosophical and everyday discourse, the literature currently lacks an account of this phenomenon that can be situated within a 'mainstream' view of communication. I propose an independently motivated account where individuals reconstruct metalinguistic propositions by means of a pragmatic, Gricean reasoning process.